This note explains the circumstances under which a type 1 quantifier can be decomposed into a type 1, 1 quantifier and a set, by fixing the first argument of the former to the latter. The motivation comes from the semantics of Noun Phrases (also called Determiner Phrases) in natural languages, but in this article, I focus on the logical facts. However, my examples are taken among quantifiers appearing in natural languages, and at the end, I sketch two more principled linguistic applications.
all ei is 'all with existential import': It is the quantifier that Aristotle (as well as many modern linguists, but few modern logicians) took 'every' to mean. Of course, lots of type 1, 1 quantifiers are much more remotely related to natural language: As to type 1 quantifiers, all but the last two of the following are familiar from logic: 
For each M, (I a ) M is the principal filter on P(M) generated by a; it is also what Montague used to interpret proper names, so that the sentences:
(1) John smokes.
(2) Some students smoke. are interpreted on the same principle, as:
where M is the discourse universe, and [[NP]] = some [[student] ] (defined in section 3) in (2) and = I j in (1).
The quantifiers C pl,u and C pl,e can be used to obtain the universal and existential interpretation of bare plurals along the same lines, as in, respectively,
(3) Firemen are brave. (4) Firemen are available.
It should be emphasized that quantifiers are global: With each universe M, they associate a second-order relation (a local quantifier) over M. This is faithful to the meaning of the corresponding phrases in natural languages. To know what 'some' means is not to know different things for different universes of discourse; it is to know just one thing, namely, the quantifier some. 1 In the case of Montagovian individuals, this means that if j ∈ M, (I j ) M (B) is always false, which seems perfectly reasonable.
Basic properties of quantifiers.
A crucial feature of quantifiers involved in natural language semantics, and in logic too for that matter, is that they mean the same thing on every universe. The following property comes very close to capturing this intuitive idea. (A, B) . Similarly for the type 1 case; EXT makes sense for quantifiers of any type. Thus, extending the universe (but not the arguments of the quantifier) has no effect. It is easy to define quantifiers that mean different things on different universes (e.g., one meaning some on universes with fewer than 10 elements, and all on larger universes), but these do not appear in natural language semantics. All type 1, 1 quantifiers mentioned above and all type 1 quantifiers, except ∀ and Q R , are EXT. In general, it seems that all type 1 natural language quantifiers are EXT, except some of those that explicitly refer to the universe, for example, by means of the predicate thing: John, firemen, three cats, all but five students, some things, at most three things are all EXT, whereas everything, most things are not.
For EXT quantifiers, mention of the universe M can be omitted; this is done whenever possible below. DEFINITION 2.3. Q is closed under isomorphism (ISOM) iff the corresponding class of structures is closed under isomorphism. In the type 1, 1 case, this is equivalent to the requirement that Q M (A, B) only depends on the cardinals of A − B, A ∩ B, B − A, and M − (A ∪ B).
Many but not all natural language quantifiers are ISOM; the exceptions mentioned above are those explicitly mentioning some individual or property, like Mary, all except John, every student's, and so forth. For logicians, it is natural to treat these individuals or properties as arguments too. For example, one could think of the quantifier at work in every student's as having type 1, 1, 1 : every C's A is B. Similarly, one could think of Mary's as taking two sets and one individual as arguments. These quantifiers-we could call them fully abstracted-would be ISOM, but the problem is that they have the wrong category. Every student's and Mary's are in important ways similar to some or most: They take a noun argument to form an NP, just like other determiners, so from a linguistic point of view, they should have type 1, 1 . Similarly, NPs formed by a determiner and a noun should have type 1 , not type 1, 1 .
The natural way to deal with this issue is to have a background model M 0 fix the interpretation of the relevant proper names or nouns. Provided the fully abstracted quantifiers are EXT, there is a unique way to treat expressions like every student's, Mary's, John, three cats, and so forth, as quantifiers of the desired types ( 1, 1 or 1 ), relative to M 0 (Peters & Westerståhl, 2006, chap. 3.5) . Naturally, however, ISOM is lost.
ISOM and EXT apply to arbitrary quantifiers. The next property, on the other hand, concerns only quantifiers having a restriction argument (usually a set argument), in particular, those of type 1, 1 .
All determiner interpretations are CONSERV and EXT. This fact is responsible for much of the special behavior of natural language quantification, and in particular for all the results in the present note. For such quantifiers, Q M (A, B) depends only on the sets A − B and A ∩ B. If Q in addition is ISOM, only the cardinality of those two sets matter.
Boolean operations on quantifiers (of the same type) are defined in the obvious way. In addition to ordinary negation, sometimes called outer negation, there is also an inner negation for quantifiers of these types; define, in the type 1 case, the quantifier Q¬ by:
In the type 1, 1 case, we replace the second argument by its complement.
Finally, we shall need suitable notions of triviality.
DEFINITION 2.5. A local quantifier Q M is trivial iff it holds either of all subsets of M or of no such subsets. Q is trivial iff each Q M is trivial.
Below, we sometimes restrict attention to finite universes; this is indicated by writing FIN.
Freezing and decomposition.
3.1. Freezing. The first argument of a type 1, 1 quantifier denoted by a determiner is called the noun or restriction argument, and the idea of freezing is simply to fix that argument to some given set C. However, the result should be a global type 1 quantifier, defined on every universe M, whether M contains C or not. This is done as follows. DEFINITION 3.1. If Q is any type 1, 1 quantifier and C any set, define the type 1 quantifier Q C , the freezing of Q to C, by:
for every M and every B ⊆ M.
Thus, the universe is expanded, if necessary, so that it includes C. Though the idea of freezing is familiar, the definitions in the literature are often vague as to how to read Q C on an arbitrary universe. One could, instead, keep M and cut down C to C ∩ M, or one could simply stipulate that (Q C ) M (B) is false when C ⊆ M. Note that all three alternatives are equivalent when C ⊆ M. It is argued in Peters & Westerståhl (2006) that (5) is the correct definition, mainly because it preserves EXT:
The other definitions suggested above do not preserve EXT. In addition, it can be seen that the facts about freezing and decomposition to be established below, as well as a number of other similar results, depend on defining Q C in the correct way, that is, as in (5).
Decomposition.
DEFINITION 3.3.
(i) A type 1 quantifier Q is decomposable iff there is a set C and a CONSERV and
Since Q 1 is required to be CONSERV and EXT, decomposition is an inverse to freezing in a precise sense explained in Peters & Westerståhl (2006, chap. 4, fact 4) . Note that without any requirements on Q 1 , the notion of (ISOM) decomposability would be empty.
FACT 3.4. For every type 1 quantifier Q, there is a set C and a type 1, 1 quantifier Q 1 such that Q = Q C 1 . Proof. Define:
Here are some familiar examples of ISOM decomposable quantifiers: Examples of decomposable but not ISOM decomposable quantifiers and of EXT but not decomposable type 1 quantifiers are given below.
A decomposable quantifier is only 'active' on the set to which the underlying type 1, 1 quantifier is frozen. The following definition and result make this claim precise. DEFINITION 3.5. Let Q 1 , Q 2 be CONSERV and EXT type 1, 1 quantifiers.
is any cardinal), iff for all M and A, B ⊆ M, and all M and A
FACT 3.6. For CONSERV and EXT Q 1 and Q 2 :
(a) If Q = Q C 1 and Q 1 and Q 2 agree on C,
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) are immediate. As to (c), if Q, Q 1 , and C are as assumed, define Q 3 by:
Clearly, Q 3 is CONSERV and EXT. Distinguishing the cases |A| = |C| and |A| = |C|, we see that Q 3 is also ISOM (in the former case, since Q 1 is ISOM on |C|, and in the latter case, since Q 3 then amounts to some). In addition, Q 1 and Q 3 agree on C, so it follows from part (a) that Q = Q C 3 . Fact 3.6 has the following immediate consequence.
1 for some C and some CONSERV and EXT Q 1 , which is ISOM on |C|.
Results.

Global quantifiers living on sets.
We are looking for some property of type 1 quantifiers, which gives a necessary and sufficient condition for decomposability. By Fact 3.2, one necessary condition is EXT; ∀ and the Rescher quantifier (everything and most things) are not decomposable already because they are not EXT. It turns out that the right place to start is the live-on property introduced in Barwise & Cooper (1981) . Conservativity is crucial to most facts about global quantifiers in natural language, but Barwise and Cooper, who were among the first to realize its importance, thought of it as a property of local quantifiers. The connection with conservativity (which is immediate if the right notion of freezing has been chosen) is the following.
FACT 4.2. A type 1, 1 quantifier Q is CONSERV iff for each set C and each universe M,
Here are some easily verified facts about the live-on property (cf. Peters & Westerståhl, 2006, chap. 3, lemma 1):
FACT 4.3.
(a) Q M always lives on M, but need not live on any proper subset of M. (b) Q M lives on ∅ iff it is trivial. (c) If Q M lives on C and D, it lives on C ∩ D. (d) If Q M lives on C and C ⊆ D, Q M lives on D.
We did not require that C ⊆ M in the definition of 'Q M lives on C', but the aforementioned fact shows that Q M lives on C if and only if Q M lives on M ∩ C. Indeed, it shows that:
which then generates the filter. We now extend the live-on notion to global quantifiers as follows. If Q lives on some set, we let:
FACT 4.6. (FIN) If Q lives on some set, it lives on W Q . That is, W Q is then the smallest set that Q lives on.
Proof. We are assuming that Q lives on some finite set C. Then, clearly,
But on the right-hand side, we have an intersection of finitely many sets. 
Decomposition and the live-on property.
Even though the live-on property for global quantifiers draws on Barwise and Cooper's local version, it is a very different property. The local version essentially codifies conservativity, and so is to be expected in all natural language contexts. Also, every local quantifier lives on some set (its universe). Global quantifiers, on the other hand, 'normally' do not live on any sets at all. For example, a nontrivial and ISOM type 1 quantifier lives on no set (Fact 4.11). In fact, the ones that do live on some set are essentially the decomposable quantifiers, as we now see. 2 This fails without the restriction to finite sets. Let Q be infinitely many numbers, that is, Q = infinitely many N , where N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Q lives not only on N but also on N − {0}, N − {0, 1}, . . . . So there is no smallest set on which it lives, and W Q as defined above is empty. Note that if Q lives on some set C, W Q is well defined: It is a subset of C defined by a firstorder set-theoretic formula. The notation W Q was used in a slightly different sense in Peters & Westerståhl (2006, chap. 4.6) , namely, for certain Q such that W Q M is independent of M (when Q M is nontrivial). But when this is the case, that notion coincides with the one defined here. The next lemma is immediate (either directly from definitions or from Facts 4.2 and 4.5, part (c)).
LEMMA 4.8. If Q is CONSERV, Q C lives on C and all its supersets.
We obtain the following characterization. THEOREM 4.9. Q is decomposable if and only if it is EXT and lives on some set.
Then, Q is EXT, and by Lemma 4.8, Q lives on C.
In the other direction, suppose Q is EXT and lives on C. Define Q 1 by:
Q 1 is CONSERV by definition, and EXT since Q is EXT. We have, for all M and all B ⊆ M,
That is, Q = Q C 1 .
COROLLARY 4.10. Proof. Part (a) follows from the theorem and Lemma 4.8. As to part (b), the claims about negations (and hence duals) follow from the easily verified observations that for CONSERV and EXT Q 1 ,
Now suppose Q = Q C 1 1 and Q = Q C 2 2 , for CONSERV and EXT Q 1 and Q 2 . By Lemma 4.8, both Q and Q live on C 1 ∪ C 2 . But then, it readily follows that Q ∧ Q and Q ∨ Q also live on C 1 ∪ C 2 . Since they are also EXT, they are decomposable, by the theorem.
We can use the easy direction of the characterization to show that various type 1 quantifiers, including many denoted by noun phrases in natural languages, are not decomposable. To begin, something and nothing (∃ and ¬∃) are EXT but not decomposable. More generally, the quantifiers at least n things (∃ ≥n ), for n ≥ 1, and all nontrivial Boolean combinations of these, including inner negations and duals, are not decomposable. These include cases like everything (∀) and all but three things ((∃ ≥3 ∧ ∃ ≤3 )¬), which are not even EXT, and so a fortiori not decomposable, but also EXT noun phrase denotations like between three and five things (∃ ≥3 ∧ ∃ ≤5 ), not to mention an even number of things, and so forth. All this follows from the simple fact that these quantifiers are (nontrivial and) ISOM.
FACT 4.11. If a type 1 quantifier is nontrivial and ISOM, it is not decomposable.
Proof. Suppose Q is nontrivial and ISOM. By Fact 3.2, we may also suppose that Q is EXT.
Case 1: ¬Q(∅). By nontriviality, there is some M and some B ⊆ M such that Q M (B). By EXT, it follows that Q B (B). Now suppose that Q lives on some set C. Take B such that |B | = |B| and C ∩ B = ∅. It follows, since Q is ISOM, that Q B (B ) and hence, since Q B lives on C, that Q B (C ∩ B ) . But this contradicts the assumption of the case. Thus, Q does not live on any set and is therefore not decomposable.
Case 2: Q(∅). Then, the previous argument shows that Q = ¬Q is not decomposable. But then, by (11), neither is Q.
What about EXT but not ISOM quantifiers? Among noun phrase denotations, we find the following. Define, for any set D, the quantifier only D by:
These are at work in the interpretation of sentences like: This underscores the familiar observation in linguistics that, first appearances notwithstanding, only is in fact not an English determiner (e.g. Peters & Westerståhl, 2006, p. 139, fn. 15 ). If it were a determiner, one would expect only firemen to be interpreted as a frozen type 1, 1 quantifier, but Fact 4.12 says it cannot be. Proof. If Q = Q C 1 for some CONSERV, EXT, and ISOM Q 1 , then Q lives on C, and it is immediate that Q does not distinguish subsets of C of the same size.
Characterizing
In the other direction, suppose Q is EXT and lives on a set C such that Q does not distinguish subsets of C of the same size. Define Q 1 by:
Q 1 is CONSERV by definition, and EXT since Q is EXT. Also, Q 1 is clearly ISOM on |C|. Moreover, we have, for any B, Here is a generalization of this observation. 
Uniqueness.
Suppose Q is (ISOM) decomposable. When is the decomposition unique, that is, when can we recover the underlying type 1, 1 quantifier and the underlying set? The first part of the question is easy. We already saw that in many cases, the underlying quantifier is not unique: I a = all {a} = (all ei ) {a} = (the sg ) {a} = some {a} , and so forth. In fact, it can never be recovered.
FACT 4.16. For every decomposable quantifier Q, one can find Q 1 , Q 2 and C such that Q 1 = Q 2 and Q = Q C 1 = Q C 2 . Proof. This is more or less immediate from Fact 3.6: If Q = Q C 1 , just let Q 2 differ from Q 1 on some D with |D| = |C|, but be the same as Q 1 otherwise.
The second part of the question is more interesting. From Corollary 4.10, part (a), we know that it is only in the case of ISOM decomposability that we have any chance to recover the underlying set. Proof. Suppose first that ¬Q(∅) holds. Let B 0 be a set of the smallest size such that Q(B 0 ). (Since Q is EXT by assumption, we can leave out the universe as usual.) Such a set exists by nontriviality. By assumption, B 0 = ∅. Moreover, by the conservativity of Q 1 (or the fact that Q M lives on C), we may assume that B 0 ⊆ C.
Suppose a ∈ C − D. Take B ⊆ C such that a ∈ B and |B| = |B 0 |. Since Q 1 is ISOM on |C|, C is finite, and Q 1 (C, B 0 ) holds, it follows that Q 1 (C, B) and thus Q(B) . Since Q lives on D, we get Q(D ∩ B) and thus Q (D ∩ (B − {a}) ) since a ∈ D. But then, Q(B − {a}), again because Q lives on D. Since B is finite, this contradicts the assumption that it was of the smallest size such that Q(B) .
Thus, C ⊆ D. If instead Q(∅) holds, We apply the same reasoning, but this time to ¬Q, which also satisfies the assumptions in the lemma. THEOREM 4.18. (FIN) If Q is nontrivial and ISOM decomposable, its underlying set is uniquely determined. More exactly, there is a unique set C such that for some Q 1 which is CONSERV, EXT, and ISOM (on |C|),
where Q 1 , Q 2 are CONSERV and EXT, and Q 1 is ISOM on |C|, whereas Q 2 is ISOM on |D|. By Lemma 4.8, Q lives on D. Thus, by Lemma 4.17, C ⊆ D. A symmetric argument shows that D ⊆ C, so C = D. The corresponding claim of uniqueness when Q 1 , Q 2 are ISOM follows by Fact 3. 6, part (b) .
Let
Un(Q, Y ) ⇐⇒ Q = Q Y 1 for some CONSERV, EXT, and ISOM Q 1 . By the theorem, assuming FIN, the relation U n is single-valued for nontrivial Q, so we can define a function U from type 1 quantifiers to sets by:
U , restricted to ISOM decomposable quantifiers, can also be defined in terms of Q alone. Recall the definition of W Q in section 4.1.
Proof. If Q is trivial, U (Q) = W Q = ∅, by Fact 4.5, part (a). Suppose Q = Q C 1 for some CONSERV, EXT, and ISOM Q 1 , and Q is nontrivial. Then, Q lives on C, and C = U (Q) by the theorem, so, by Fact 4.6, W Q ⊆ U (Q). Also, since Q lives on W Q , it follows by Lemma 4.17 that U (Q) ⊆ W Q . So in both cases, U (Q) = W Q .
Putting together all the above, we obtain a final characterization of ISOM decomposability. The restriction to finite universes is essential for the results in this subsection. For example, the quantifier mentioned in footnote 2, Q = infinitely many numbers, is nontrivial and ISOM decomposable, W Q = ∅, Q does not live on any finite set, and for each n, Q = (infinitely many) N −{0,1,...,n} (where N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}) .
Some instructive examples. Suppose
where Q 1 is not ISOM. Can we conclude anything about the ISOM decomposability of Q? No: Even if Q is ISOM decomposable, it is equal to Q C 1 for infinitely many C and infinitely many non-ISOM Q 1 . We give some examples to illustrate that natural quantifiers of the form Q C 1 with non-ISOM Q 1 are sometimes ISOM decomposable and sometimes not.
In section 2.1, we defined simple possessive quantifiers like John's by: R( j, b)}, and j = John) . This is a special case of:
Compare sentences like:
(17) John's bikes were (all) stolen.
(18) Most of Mary's friends are here.
(19) All but two of Henry's job applications failed.
Here, Q 2 = all, most, and all but two, respectively. None of the possessive type 1, 1 quantifiers in (17)-(19) is ISOM, but we still have the following. Proof. Q is clearly EXT. We have:
If C ∩ R j = ∅, then Q is trivial and hence trivially ISOM decomposable, and W Q = ∅ (Lemma 4.5, part (a)). If C ∩ R j = ∅, then, by (20), Q = (Q 2 ) C∩R j and hence is ISOM decomposable by the assumption on Q 2 . Also, if FIN holds, we see from Corollary 4.19 that W Q = C ∩ R j .
Thus, the smallest set that, say, John's books lives on is not the set of books in the discourse universe, but the set of books owned by John (if R = owns) (cf. Corollary 4.20) .
What about other frozen possessive quantifiers? I will not try to answer this question in any generality here but only give a few more illustrative examples. Consider the determiner some student's. This has (at least) two readings, a universal and an existential one, illustrated by:
(21) Some student's tennis rackets were stolen. (22) Some student's books were left in the classroom.
A plausible reading of (21) is that some students had all their tennis rackets stolen, whereas (22) can be taken to mean that some, but not necessarily all, of the students' books had been left in the room. The two readings are given by, respectively, Proof. We use Theorem 4.14. Let:
It is not hard to verify that:
(26) Q lives on C 0 . Also, it follows from the definition of (some D s) e that:
This entails that Q does not distinguish subsets of C 0 of the same size. Since Q is clearly EXT, it follows from Theorem 4.14 that Q is ISOM decomposable.
Although I will not prove it here, it is a general fact about possessive quantifiers frozen to a set C that they live on the set C 0 defined in (25). In particular, ((some D's) u ) C does so, and we see that (with D = {j}) the quantifiers (Q 2 of John's) C do so too. In this latter case, we have W Q = C 0 = C ∩ R j , but in general, W Q can be a proper subset of C 0 . To give an example, suppose D = {s 1 , s 2 }, C = {b 1 , b 2 }, and R = {(s 1 , b 1 ), (s 2 , b 1 ), (s 2 , b 2 )}. Then, C 0 = C, and one easily verifies that with Q = ((some D's) u ) C , we have ¬Q(∅), Q({b 1 }), ¬Q({b 2 }), and Q({b 1 , b 2 }). From this, one sees that:
For this particular choice of C, D, R, we also have that ((some D's) u ) C is ISOM decomposable. This is a consequence of Corollary 4.20. Proof. Then, Q trivially does not distinguish subsets of W Q of the same size! However, a similar example shows that a slightly different possessive quantifier need not be ISOM decomposable. Consider:
(28) (Exactly) two students' dorm rooms were burglarized.
One plausible interpretation is:
Let D = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, C = {b 1 , b 2 }, and R = {(s 1 , b 1 ), (s 2 , b 1 ), (s 3 , b 2 )}. Again C 0 = C, and one sees that with Q = (two D's) C , we have ¬Q(∅), Q({b 1 }), ¬Q({b 2 }), and ¬Q({b 1 , b 2 }). For example, in the last case, the number of Ds such that every C they are related to by R belongs to {b 1 , b 2 } is 3, not 2. But then, Q lives neither on {b 1 } nor on {b 2 }, although it does live on C 0 = {b 1 , b 2 }. So W Q = {b 1 , b 2 }, and it follows that Q does distinguish some subsets of W Q of the same cardinality (namely, {b 1 } and {b 2 }). We have shown the following. We see that the ISOM decomposability (or not) of frozen possessive quantifiers sometimes depends on the choice of the 'possessor' relation. For example, we can make the following observation. 4 FACT 4.25. If R is a (partial) function, then for all D and C, Q = ((some D's) u ) C is ISOM decomposable.
Proof. That R is a partial function means that for all a, R a has at most one element. From this, and the fact that Q is monotone (Q(B) and B ⊆ B implies Q(B ) ), one verifies that, with C 0 as in (25),
It follows that for all non-empty subsets B of C 0 we have Q(B). So in particular, Q does not distinguish subsets of C 0 of the same size. Since Q lives on C 0 and is EXT, Q is ISOM decomposable, by Theorem 4.14.
However, most 'possessor' relations, like real ownership, are not partial functions (one normally owns many different things).
Note finally that although the proof of Fact 4.24 makes use of Corollary 4.20, it identifies a finite set as the smallest set the quantifier lives on. This is independent of the size of the universe; a finite counterexample to ISOM decomposability is given, and this fact, in contrast with positive results of ISOM decomposability using Corollary 4.20, like Fact 4.23, does not rely on FIN. The same holds for our final example. 
As to subsets of C 0 = C, we then have:
(i) Q holds of {b 1 } and its supersets and of {b 3 , b 4 } and its supersets.
Using the monotonicity of Q, and going through the various cases, one can verify that:
and then that
So Q distinguishes subsets of W Q of the same size (e.g., {b 1 } and {b 3 }) and hence is not ISOM decomposable.
Observe also that:
((some D's) u ) C = a∈D (all of a's) C , so we have another illustration of the fact that ISOM decomposability is not closed under disjunction (cf. Fact 4.15).
Applications.
Noun phrases abound in most languages, as immediate constituents of other phrases: sentences, verb phrases, prepositional phrases, and so forth. In a compositional semantics, the semantic value of the larger phrase is determined by the values of the immediate constituents (and the 'mode of composition'). Suppose the value of the NP is of the form Q C , but calculating the value of the larger phrase requires access to C and/or Q. Then, we have at least a prima facie problem for compositionality since the phrases whose values are Q and C are not immediate constituents of the larger phrase. Does this situation actually occur? We look at two cases. In examples like this, each other can be construed as a type 1, 2 quantifier E O, where E O(A, R) says roughly that all individuals in A 'R each other'. But this can mean different things. For example, in (34), we seem to have: ⇒ R(a, b) ).
Reciprocals. Consider the sentences
(33), on the other hand, rather uses E O 2 : & R(a, b) ).
(It is difficult to stare at more than one person at a time.)
The meaning of the whole sentence can then be obtained as a 'Ramsey lift' along the following scheme:
That is, if Q is a type 1, 1 quantifier like most (one usually assumes that the quantifier is increasing in the right argument, like most, or John's), (35) gives a type 1, 2 quantifier Ram i (Q) suitable for interpreting certain reciprocal sentences.
The most natural compositional analysis of sentences like (33) and (34) would seem to go like this:
But to get the meaning of the sentence, according to (35), at the last step, we in general need access not only to Q C but also to C. Thus, Theorem 4.18 applies, when Q C is ISOM decomposable (like most pirates or John's companions) and only finite universes are considered. Since C = U (Q C ) = W Q C , this theorem guarantees the compositionality of the corresponding reciprocal constructions. 6
Possessives. Next, consider:
(36) Most planets' rings are made of ice.
Here too we have an NP, most planets, whose interpretation is of the form Q C and which is naturally seen as an immediate constituent of the phrase most planets' (which can be taken to be a determiner). But in this case, access to C does not seem to be enough. This is because most in (36) does not really quantify over all the planets, but only over those that have rings. Planets without rings are irrelevant to the truth value of (36). The phenomenon was called narrowing in Barker (1995) (from which the example is taken).
Thus, we need access to Q C , for some C ⊆ C. But, as we have seen, this is in general not possible. One cannot recover Q from Q C and therefore not Q C either, when C = C, even if C is known. In Peters and Westerståhl (in preparation) , we analyze the situation and conclude that this appears to constitute a serious problem for the compositionality of the semantics for possessives.
We also note a related problem for possessive semantics. If one construes the semantics so that not Q C but both Q and C are taken as arguments when calculating the meaning of possessive phrases, one has an additional problem besides compositionality: What to do when the NP is not quantified, as in (37) The obvious answer is: decompose! But one problem is that such decomposition is not unique. For example, I m = all {m} = (all ei ) {m} , and the truth conditions vary slightly with the decomposition chosen. 7 Another issue is that phrases of the form [NP 's] are sometimes problematic. Consider:
